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Abstract—Privacy policies are statements that notify users of
the services’ data practices. However, few users are willing to
read through policy texts due to the length and complexity. While
automated tools based on machine learning exist for privacy
policy analysis, to achieve high classification accuracy, classifiers
need to be trained on a large labeled dataset. Most existing
policy corpora are labeled by skilled human annotators, requiring
significant amount of labor hours and effort. In this paper, we
leverage active learning and crowdsourcing techniques to develop
an automated classification tool named Calpric (Crowdsourcing
Active Learning PRIvacy Policy Classifier), which is able to
perform annotation equivalent to those done by skilled human
annotators with high accuracy while minimizing the labeling cost.
Specifically, active learning allows classifiers to proactively select
the most informative segments to be labeled. On average, our
model is able to achieve the same F1 score using only 62%
of the original labeling effort. Calpric’s use of active learning
also addresses naturally occurring class imbalance in unlabeled
privacy policy datasets as there are many more statements stating
the collection of private information than stating the absence
of collection. By selecting samples from the minority class for
labeling, Calpric automatically creates a more balanced training
set.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy policies are legal documents that disclose how
a party collects, uses, and shares private information data.
Privacy legislation, such as the California Online Privacy
Protection Act (CalOPPA) and the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), require online services to use privacy
policies to obtain consent for collection and use of private in-
formation. However, studies have shown that users are unlikely
to read privacy policies, as it would take hundreds of hours
to read all the privacy policies a typical person encounters
over a year [23]. Given this challenge, there have been many
proposals to use machine learning-based text processing tools
to distill critical information from privacy policies and provide
it to both users and regulators [10], [48]. While there has
been some success, an ongoing challenge with this approach
is the difficulty of obtaining large, high-quality labeled training
sets that are required by machine learning to be effective. For
instance, Liu et al. [18] show that privacy policy paragraphs
can be classified with average micro-F1 scores of 0.78, with
their model being trained on the OPP-115 corpus [40], which
consists of 23K data practices, 128K practice attributes, and
103K labeled text spans extracted from 115 privacy policies.
The difficulty of obtaining labeled data stems from the
conventional wisdom that privacy policies are hard to read and
understand, and thus must be labeled by skilled annotators. As
an example, the most widely-used OPP-115 dataset is prepared
by 10 skilled annotators (i.e law students or those with legal
training), spending an average of 72 minutes on each privacy
policy. While labeling privacy policies is labor intensive and
expensive, unlabeled policies are easily accessible. In this
work, we propose the use of active learning, in which a
short series of sentences is extracted from the original privacy
policy, where all sentences are related to the same data
practice. An ideal segment contains all necessary information
for labelers to understand the described data practices and
excludes redundant details that may require extra time and
effort to read.
To evaluate this idea, we design and implement Calpric
(Crowdsourcing Active Learning PRIvacy Policy Classifier),
which classifies a privacy policy as either collecting or not
collecting three of the most commonly collected classes of
private data: user contacts, user location and the device iden-
tifier. Calpric uses active learning to select the policy segments
that will most improve model accuracy. These segments are
sent to Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and labeled by
crowdsourcing workers (Turkers). Calpric is based on the Pri-
vacy Policy Word Embedding bidirectional Long Short Term
Memory (PPWE-biLSTM) and focuses on labeling first party
data practices involving collection/use of contact, location, and
device information. We apply Calpric to a corpus of 52K
privacy policies obtained by scraping the Google Play store,
a large online market for Android applications. Using active
learning and policy segmentation, Calpric is able to achieve
a classification accuracy of 97.6%, which exceeds that of
models trained on data sets labeled by skilled labelers (e.g.,
law students).
We find that one of the reasons Calpric is able to achieve
significantly better accuracy is that its use of active learning
allows it to mitigate class imbalance, which is known to lead
to lower model accuracy. Privacy policy labeling suffers from
heavy class imbalance as there are significantly more positive
segments that assert data collection (e.g., “The Application
also accesses the names of individuals in the user’s contacts.”),
than negative segments that assert the absence of data col-
lection (e.g., “We do not collect your name, email addresses,
postal addresses, and/or telephone numbers.”). In fact, the most
widely used labeled privacy policy datasets, OPP-115 and
APP-350, contain only 2.0% and 18.6% negative segments,
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respectively. By selecting the policy segments that are most
likely to improve model accuracy, we find that active learning
allows Calpric to identify and use the negative samples in our
large dataset and thus achieve a balanced training set despite
the naturally occurring bias towards positive samples.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1) We present Calpric, the first system we are aware of that
applies active learning to the problem of privacy policy
classification.
2) We find that by automatically decomposing privacy
policies into segments, Calpric is able to use active learn-
ing to identify the individual segments across privacy
policies that are most valuable, allowing it to increase
its accuracy with far fewer labeled segments.
3) We study different design options in deploying Calpric
and show that Calpric is able to achieve 97.6% labeling
accuracy with Amazon Turker workers, which exceeds
that of previous studies that used skilled workers to label
policies.
II. RELATED WORKS
We study prior works on automated privacy policy analysis
in Section II-A and investigate active learning techniques
and their application on top of deep learning models in
Section II-B.
A. Privacy Policy Analysis
Given the number and length of privacy policies, much of
the related work focuses on extracting important information
from them and identify the related data practices. Watanabe
et al. [39] use keyword extraction on privacy policies to iden-
tify non-compliance between mobile apps and their privacy
policies. Wilson et al. [40] built and trained text classifiers
using the OPP-115 Corpus, which consists of 115 website
privacy policies labeled by legal experts. Using the same
data corpus, Frederick et al. [18] presented a performance
comparison among Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector
Machine (SVM), and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
models, and has used this to also detect non-compliance in
Android applications [48]. Harkous et al. [10] developed a
multi-label classifier using CNN to label policies using major
categories and smaller attributes. Elisa et al. [5] presented a
solution to automatically assess the completeness of a policy
using more complex algorithms such as Linear Support Vector
Machines (LSVM). Zimmeck et al. [47] also created a labeled
mobile app-specific privacy policy corpus, APP-350. To com-
pensate the rarity of negative annotation labels, they introduced
synthetic data by manually changing positive policy texts into
negative samples. Finally, Elisa et al. [5] extracted texts from
64 privacy policies, and labeled them by a single annotator.
Because Calpric leverages crowdsourcing to efficiently label
samples, it is able to build a larger labeled dataset and achieve
significantly greater accuracy using machine learning than
previous work. In addition, while Zimmeck et al. [47] used
synthetic training points to address class imbalance, Calpric
overcomes the imbalanced training set by mining a large
unlabeled dataset for potential negative samples and gets them
labeled with active learning.
Although Zimmeck et al. [46] and Wilson et al. [41] also
explore the crowdsourcing option, in both studies, labelers
are required to read through the entire privacy policy and
answer questions accordingly. In contrast, we pre-preprocess
policies into segments that address the same data practice to
reduce labeling effort, as suggested by Schaub et al. [28].
Whereas Wilson et al. [41] focus on methodology to increase
the crowdsourcing productivity, such as highlighting the most
relevant paragraphs in a privacy policy, we shift the focus and
extend our work to classification of policy segments. Our study
also differs from all prior published work on privacy policy
classification because we integrate active learning algorithms
on top of regular classifiers. Combined with the use of policy
segments, Calpric is able to address the class imbalance
issue by automatically querying more negative samples in the
unlabeled training pool.
B. Active Learning
Active learning is an iterative training strategy where an
initial model is trained in the normal fashion, and it is then
allowed to select unlabeled training instances using a query
strategy. In each active learning iteration, a number of selected
labels are sent to a query oracle for labeling and the model is
then updated with the newly labeled training points—we use
Amazon mTurk as our query oracle. The model can be trained
for an arbitrary number of such iterations until a pre-defined
stopping point is reached.
In general, there are three active learning scenarios: mem-
bership querying synthesis, stream-based, and pool-based se-
lective sampling. Pool-based selective sampling has been
the most well-studied scenario, especially for text classifica-
tion [38] and information extraction [32]. The major advantage
of this method is that it evaluates and ranks the entire set
of unlabeled training points before selecting the next one
to label [30]. We select pool-based sampling because it is
applicable to Calpric’s scenario as we have the entire unlabeled
training set up front and it is the most effective and widely
used sampling mode for text classification.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that performs deep
active learning classification on privacy policies. However,
there are related studies using similar learning approaches in
areas such as image analysis and classification [42], [9], and
natural language processing (NLP). Zhang et al. [43] imple-
mented active learning strategies on top of CNNs for sentiment
analysis, whereas Shen et al. [34] investigated uncertainty-
based active learning heuristic for sequence tagging on a newly
proposed CNN-CNN-LSTM architecture. We build upon prior
work and experiment with our PPWE-biLSTM and the fine-
tuned BERT [7] classifiers, which are proven to be the state-
of-the-art NLP models for text classification tasks [45], [12].
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of our proposed
system, comprising four major components: data preparation
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Fig. 1: A simplified overview of the active learning system
in Section IV, and crowdsourcing in Section V, querying and
active learning covered in Section VI.
The objective of Calpric is to extract whether a privacy
policy declares collection for a particular private data category.
Currently Calpric supports three private data categories: user
contacts, location, and device ID. To do so, we design Calpric
to be a combination of multiple binary classifiers, each being
responsible for classification of one private data category.
The binary classifiers are trained on policy segments of the
according categories.
In the preprocessing stage, we download 375K Android app
privacy policies from the Google Play Store, filter out dupli-
cates, process and sanitize them, resulting in a total of 52K
privacy policies in raw text format. To reduce crowdsourcing
effort and increase label accuracy, instead of requiring labelers
to read through the entire privacy policy, we extract smaller
policy segments from the original policies, and pre-classify
them into groups using basic keyword extraction heuristics.
In each active learning iteration, the model selects the most
representative segments S from the unlabeled training pool,
denoted by XU . These segments are sent to mTurk and labeled
by multiple Turkers, in order to reduce the possibility of
erroneous labels. The assigned labels are post-processed into a
single labeled policy segment and added to the accumulated la-
beled training set XL. The process of requesting and retrieving
labeled data is handled by the query oracle. Using the training
set with new labels added, the classification model updates its
weights ω and repeats the process until a pre-defined stopping
criterion is satisfied. We describe Calpric in more detail below.
IV. DATA PREPARATION
Calpric requires a small set of labeled privacy policy seg-
ments to boot-strap the active learning process and a large
set of unlabeled privacy policy segments. The data prepara-
tion process begins with privacy policy acquisition, which is
covered in Section IV-A, followed by policy segmentation in
Section IV-B.
A. Policy Downloading
We scrape Android application metadata, including the link
to the app’s privacy policy, from the Android Google Playstore.
We then filter out broken or invalid privacy policy links.
We only consider policies that are in HTML format, though
we could have easily extended our preprocessing to handle
less common formats such as PDF or raw text. Our web
scraper is based on the dragnet’s pre-trained model [25].
The downloaded HTML is then passed through a sanitization
pipeline, in which the irrelevant elements, including HTML
tags, advertisement, and UI features (eg., navigation bar), are
removed. We verify that the downloaded pages are actually
privacy policies by checking for the presence of keywords
such as “privacy policy” and “legal” as well as by excluding
any documents with fewer than 50 words. Finally, we verify
text language using the Python langdetect library [24] as the
Calpric models currently only handle English text. Finally, we
identify and remove duplicates, leaving 51,781 usable privacy
policies.
B. Policy Segmentation
Next, we extract policy segments, which will form the
training points for Calpric. Policy segmentation includes the
following tasks: keyword filtering, segmentation and pre-
classification.
We first tokenize each privacy policy into a list of sentences
using the Python NLTK library [1]. Calpric then filters the
sentences using keywords corresponding to three private data
categories: contacts, location and device ID. For example,
we use keywords such as “email” and “phone number” to
extract sentences that discuss the handling of private data in
the contacts category and keywords such as “IP address” for
the device ID category.
We then segment the privacy policies. The objective of seg-
mentation is to include only the necessary sentences required
to understand what the privacy policy is declaring with respect
to the private data category. A typical example of a policy
segment is as follows:
Personal information is data that can be used to
uniquely identify or contact a single person. When
you visit, download or upgrade our app or our
products, we do not use this information explicitly.
However, we may collect personal information to
improve our services and deliver a better experience.
All sentences in the segment contribute to the meaning of
the segment. For instance, without the first sentence, it is
not clear that personal information refers to contact infor-
mation. However, if the segment only contains the first two
sentences, readers may be misled to provide a negative label
to the segment. Finally, the sentence immediately following
the snippet was “Please be aware that when you register and
set up an account, you will at minimum have to download the
Application onto your mobile device.” This sentence is not
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required to understand whether the application was collecting
private contact information or not, and thus should not be
included in the segment.
Segments are constructed in two steps. First, Calpric checks
for keywords such as “include” or “for example”, as well as
punctuation marks such as semicolons and question marks,
which indicate that the previous sentence may contain infor-
mation related to the current one.
Second, Calpric uses NLP algorithms to measure the sim-
ilarity of consecutive sentences. As a part of the algorithm,
similar to Harkous et al. [10], we create a domain-specific
word embedding trained by the 52K downloaded policies on
top of Fasttext [2] and use it to generate vector representations
of sentences. While there are various general-purpose pre-
trained word embeddings available, customized embeddings
tend to achieve better performance for classification tasks [37].
As a Fasttext-based embedding that allows vector training on
sub-words, the policy embedding is able to interpret words
with spelling mistakes and, more importantly, captures the
actual meaning of proper nouns, which usually consist of
several words.
Calpric measures sentence similarities using the Word
Mover’s Distance (WMD) [16], which evaluates how relevant
the previous sentence is to the current one. Dias et al. [8]
propose a threshold function that consists of the average
and the standard deviation of the downhills depths, where
downhills represent topic shifts in a document. To determine
if there is a topic boundary between two sentences, our tool
compares the WMD similarity of these sentences against
a Segment Threshold (ST), which is calculated for every
individual privacy policy; if the similarity is larger than the
threshold, the two sentences are considered to be related.
Therefore there should be no boundary between them.
ST is calculated as follows:
ST = µ+ Topic Boundary Constant× σ, (1)
where µ and σ are the WMD mean and standard deviation of
sentences in a privacy policy, respectively. The topic boundary
constant value in Calpric is set to 2.5.
After segmentation, Calpric now has a set of unlabeled
segments labeled by private data category XUcontact, XUdevice,
and XUlocation. In total our 52K privacy policies produced
153K, 63K, and 38K segments for contacts, location, and
device ID, respectively.
V. CROWDSOURCING
Individual segments are labeled by crowdworkers hired to
perform Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) on the Amazon
mTurk service. Each segment is labeled by five workers and
we consolidate the the results into a single label, which we
add to the labeled training set XL for the respective data
category. In this section, we cover the design of the HIT survey
questions Section V-A, and methods to ensure data reliability
in Section V-B. The use of human workers was approved by
our institutional review board (IRB).
A. Survey Questions
Amazon mTurk provides a platform for requesters to publish
HITs, in the form of surveys to a market, which are accepted
and performed by Turkers. Our Amazon mTurk HITs consist
of two questions (see Appendix A). The first question confirms
that the policy segment is a First Party Collection/Use, while
the second question asks whether or not the policy segment
claims to collect/use private data of that type. Labels for
segments where Turkers answer “No” for the first question
are discarded, as these segments are likely not relevant to data
collection. For the remaining labels, the answer to the second
question is converted to a positive label if Turkers answer
“Yes” and a negative label if Turkers answer “No”.
Because some Turkers may incorrectly label other policy
segments, each survey is sent to five Turkers and we measure
the level of agreement between the Turkers for each segment,
and only accept labels where there is sufficient agreement. In
addition, some privacy policy segments are inherently ambigu-
ous and open to interpretation. Because they are a vehicle for
obtaining consent, privacy policies should be understandable
by people with no legal training. As a result, if regular people
cannot agree on the meaning of a policy segment, then it has
no definite meaning, and thus is not a useful training point for
Calpric.
Our final survey questions were selected from a set of
four survey variants we had constructed. To determine the
best one, we computed the Alignment Rate (AR) for each
survey variant. To calculate AR, we first need to introduce
several definitions. Agreement Percentage (AP) refers to the
percentage of Turkers labeled a segment the same way. For
instance, if five workers select Yes for a segment, two select
No, and yet another three others select Other, the AP will be
5/(3 + 2 + 5) = 50%. To filter out low-confidence labels,
we pre-define a threshold above which the AP must fall for
the label to be considered reliable (i.e., the segment is not
ambiguous and the Turkers labeled the segment correctly).
We call this threshold the Acceptance Threshold (AT) and
default it to 80% in this study. We refer labels that pass the AT
as Aligned Labels. AR is thus the number of aligned labels
extracted from segments over the total number of segments
published for labeling. From this we can see that when used
on the same set of segments, and run over a sufficiently large
number of Turkers, a survey variant that achieves a higher
AR is likely more consistently interpreted by the Turkers and
will thus yield fewer erroneous labels. We note that this simple
AR metric achieves a similar result as more complex measures
of correlation of internal consistency as our labels are binary
(collect or no-collect).
We measure AR for our variants by preparing three batches
of questions, with 10 different policy segments per batch. We
randomly select the segments from the APP-350 dataset, which
were labeled by skilled labelers and we consider them as 100%
reliable. Using four different versions of survey questions,
we calculate the AR on 30 policy segments drawn from the
APP-350 dataset, with each segment labeled by five Turkers.
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The AR varies from 45% to 73%, with the average labeling
accuracy between 70% to 75% for all versions. We select the
version with the highest AR for all future crowdsourcing tasks.
B. Label Reliability
Because we create training labels by crowdsourcing instead
of legal experts, we need to ensure label reliability and reduce
data noise as much as possible. Previous studies show that
there should be an emphasis on quality control when dealing
with crowdsourcing tasks because they may have varying
degrees of skill or may not pay full attention when performing
HITs [5]. We introduced a set of quality controls to validate
crowdsourcing workers and filter out low-quality data.
1) Worker Requirements: The published HITs only allow
qualified workers to answer survey questions. We set the
following requirements on Amazon mTurk:
• Approval Rate > 85
• Number of HITs Approved > 50
• English Speaker
• Android Mobile User
2) Consolidating by the Rule of Majority: As mentioned,
the policy texts were processed and segmented into small
segments, and labeled by crowdsourcing workers on Amazon
mTurk. After gathering segment labels from the workers, we
consolidate the results using the rule of majority: most of the
annotators must agree on the same label. If the AP of a certain
label is smaller than the pre-defined AT, we consider it as a
low confidence label and do not include it in our training set,
as it may contaminate the classifiers.
3) Repeat Workers: Due to the nature of majority rule, we
need to ensure that no worker answers the same question
repeatedly. We implement a qualification test embedded in
every published batch to check the worker IDs that have
previously accepted the same batch of questions. Permission
to access our survey is only given to Turkers who had not
participated in the same question.
4) Knowledge Test and Honesty Test: There are cases where
crowdsourcers provide bogus answers without actually doing
work [41] or where adversarial bots that enter spam answers
on crowdsourcing platforms to earn money [22]. To prevent
noise from such interference, we aim to design a qualification
test in the form of simple questions to verify if the workers
are qualified to answer our questions.
We first consider a knowledge test, which uses segments
from the APP-350 as a test, combined with other unlabeled
segments to see if the Turker is able to label the test segment
correctly. If the Turker fails the test, we do not use any of
that Turker’s labels. To test the effectiveness of the knowledge
test, we randomly select 60 questions from APP-350 and
experiment on two surveys, randomly designating a question
in one survey as the knowledge test and having no knowledge
test question in the other survey. Each survey is given to
five Turkers to perform. Our results show that many Turkers
who answered the test question incorrectly still provide useful
labels, and the difference in accuracy between the survey with
the knowledge test and the survey without is 100% and 97.6%,
respectively. For this small difference in accuracy, we would
have had to discard a large number of surveys—using the
knowledge test we would need to run twice as many surveys
as without to achieve the same number of labeled segments.
We thus conclude that such knowledge was not effective in
improving label quality.
Instead, we implement a simple honesty checking question,
where we ask the Turkers whether they paid close attention to
the questions and provide answers accordingly, and highlight
the fact that they will still receive full payments even if
they did not. Such questions were proved to be effective in
improving labeling accuracy [26]. We performed a similar test
survey with the honesty checking question and discarded all
labels of Turkers who answered “No” to the honesty checking
question. The accuracy of this survey was 97.7% and when
deployed, we found that the honesty question was answered
“Yes” 99.63% of the time. We include the testing results in
Table I.
Aligned
Labels AR
Correct
Labels Accuracy
With Know Test 20 33.3% 20 100%
Without Any Test 42 70.0% 41 97.6%
With Honesty Test 43 71.7% 42 97.7%
TABLE I: Impact of knowledge test and honesty checking question
on data collecting performance using 60 test segments
5) Turker Wages and Performance: We experimented on
worker wages and decided on a payment of $0.60 per batch
per Turker. The average time to complete a 40-question survey
is 7 minutes. As Lovett et al. [20] suggest, a standard of
$0.15 per minute should be adequate for most Turkers. We
tested on three different payments ($0.10, $0.60, and $1.50
per batch) using five different batches, the resulting average
AR are 31.9%, 77.0%, and 76.0%, respectively, as shown in
Table II. Note that the $0.10 payment results in a significant
drop in the AR. One batch was not even completed as no more
workers were willing to take the task for such a low payment.
Batch 1 Batch 2 Batch 3 Batch 4 Batch 5 Overall
$0.1 22.5% 12.5% 20.0% 72.5% - 31.9% 1
$0.6 80.0% 57.5% 82.5% 85.0% 80.0% 77.0%
$1.5 75.0% 55.0% 87.5% 85.0% 77.5% 76.0%
Avg 59.2% 41.7% 63.3% 80.8% 78.8% 63.8%
TABLE II: Performance on alignment rate for different payments
We observe that experienced workers are not attracted by
the extremely low payment, while workers who accepted these
tasks did not spend much effort doing questions, as reflected
by the result of $0.10. On the other hand, surprisingly, the
higher pay rate of $1.50 did not necessarily produce better
results. Despite that these Turkers spending more time on the
labeling tasks, the overall AR did not vary much from that
of the $0.60 pay rate. We observe a performance ceiling due
to the fact that some policy segments are vague by nature. It
is difficult to label them, even for legal experts. We therefore
1Calculated based on n=4 without considering the uncompleted batch
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concluded that $0.60 per batch per worker is an appropriate
payment, and use this setting in all other experiments and
evaluations.
VI. AUTOMATED PRIVACY POLICY CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we present our automated privacy policy
analysis tool. We discuss the basic machine learning (ML)
model selection in Section VI-A, and active learning strategies
to improve label efficiency in Section VI-B.
A. Classification Model Description
Because crowdsourcing holds the promise of providing
more labeled data than previous studies, we are able to use
more complex, higher capacity models than previous works
that which used models such as LR and SVM. Traditional
CNNs experience the issue of long-distance dependency in text
classification, while recent NLP studies solve this problem by
introducing RNNs, LSTM, and BERT models. These models
have been proven to achieve a better overall performance in
text classification [19], [45], [7].
A commonly used, state-of-the-art language model is BERT,
which can be fine-tuned for various tasks including text
classification. However, because active learning is an iterative
training algorithm, an important factor is the retraining time
of the model that is selected. While accurate, BERT suffers
from slow training due to its complexity and the number
of parameters involved, despite it being an application of
transfer learning. Joselson and Hallen [12] evaluate a fine-
tuned BERT model and a customized biLSTM classifier for
sentiment analysis, and show that the former model requires
hours more training while achieving similar performance (69%
vs. 71%). As a result, developed our own model based on
biLSTM, which we call PPWE-biLSTM.
The model is implement with bidirectional LSTM layers
and a customized privacy policy word embedding trained on
top of the general-purpose Fasttext embedding. Our LSTM
nodes are bidirectional, so two recurrent layers in opposite
directions serve as a platform for training in the past and
future of a specific time frame. The PPWE-biLSTM used in
our experiments consists of a hidden layer with 100 densely
connected memory units, as the structure is proved to achieve
a lower perplexity than regular stacked models [13], [11]. We
use leaky ReLUs [21] and dropouts [35] of 0.1 to prevent over-
fitting while sustaining the weight updates to avoid vanishing
gradient problems in the propagation process [21]. We apply
a sigmoid activation function to the model output for binary
prediction. We use binary cross entropy loss and ADAM
optimizer [14] to find model weights. We used BATCH SIZE
of 20 and EPOCHS = 4. We apply the same vectorization
method with our customized word embedding for the ML
component. An evaluation of PPWE-biLSTM vs. BERT is
included in Section VII-C. We use the above model setup as
default for all experiments, unless specified otherwise.
B. Applying Active Learning
Recall that we decide to investigate pool-based sampling
because we have the entire unlabeled training set available
and it is the most effective and widely used sampling mode
for text classification. The detailed setup is described in the fol-
lowing sections, including querying strategies (Section VI-B1),
alignment threshold (Section VI-B2), and re-labeling strategies
(Section VI-B3).
1) Querying Strategies: As mentioned, the active learner
proactively selects a subset of available examples in each
learning iteration. The key question is, how does the learner
identify which labels are considered to be the most informa-
tive? While Settles [30] describes a wide range of existing
querying strategies, we first investigate uncertainty-based sam-
pling [17] as it is the most commonly used query framework.
In this framework, unlabeled samples are ranked according
to how much confidence in predictions made by the current
model. Within uncertainty-based sampling, there are a number
of algorithms:
• Least Confidence (LC): selects the least certain instance
from the unlabeled set and request for it to be labeled.
• Margin Sampling (MS): selects instances where the dif-
ference between the first most likely and second most
likely classes are the smallest.
• Entropy-based Sampling (ES): selects samples with the
largest entropy in class probabilities.
For binary classification, MS and ES reduce to LC. In
such cases, the three methods will query instances with a
class posterior closest to 0.5, that is, the most ambiguous
segments [30]. As a result, we will refer to these algorithms
as LC.
We further explore other querying strategies based on the re-
duction [27], the density-weighted [31], and the batch mode [3]
framework:
• Expected Error Reduction (EER): selects instances that
make the most impact on the current model, specifically,
how much the generalization error is likely to be reduced
as the new samples are introduced to the model. We
built upon Roy and McCallum’s work [27], calculate the
expected future error of a classifier using the Monte Carlo
Estimation.
• Information Density (ID): considers not only uncertain
instances, but also those which are representative of the
dense region of the input space.
• Batch Mode Uncertainty (BMU): first prioritizes diversity
on the initial iterations, providing a global view of the in-
put distribution; then, as the number of labeled instances
increases, the system shifts the priority to instances about
which the classifier is uncertain. Our design makes use
of the modAL active learning framework, which is built
upon the study of Cardoso et al. [3].
We describe the detailed implementations of each of these
algorithms in Appendix C.
2) Acceptance Threshold & Alignment Rate: As described
in the previous section, the acceptance threshold (AT) defines
the minimum agreement percentage (AP) among labelers that
must be achieved for a label to be accepted. There are several
prior studies on privacy policy classification (without AL)
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using crowdsourcing methods, in which 80% and 100% are
the most common thresholds [36], [41].
Setting the AT has a clear trade-off: increasing the AT will
result in a decrease in Alignment Rate (AR), which eventually
leads to the query oracle needing to create more mTurk HITs
to achieve the same number of labeled samples. This directly
increases the cost of labeling for Calpric, but may lead to
higher quality training data. However, we also need to take into
account that some segments may be inherently ambiguous and
thus may never achieve an AP greater than the AT, regardless
of how many HITs are published.
As a result, while Calpric uses a default AT of 80%, it’s AT
is configurable and we evaluate the effect of AT on Calpric’s
accuracy in Section VII-E.
3) Re-labeling Strategies: Recall that labels for segments
where the query oracle doesn’t achieve an AP above the AT
are not added to XL. Calpric implements two options for what
will be done with such segments:
Label and Discard: This option compensates for the possi-
bility that some number of labels will be discarded as they
do not pass the AT. As a result, in order to achieve the 30
labels Calpric aims to add to XL in each iteration, we use
the average AR to estimate the total number of segments we
should submit for labeling. In our experiments, we estimate
AR for our survey to be 73%, which requires Calpric to request
42 segments to be labeled on each iteration. Segments that do
not meet the AT are discarded and can never be selected by
the query strategy again based on the assumption that they are
inherently ambiguous.
Incremental Re-labeling: The above strategy may be overly
conservative in discarding segments that fail the AT test after
only one iteration, as segments may also fail to pass the test
due to poor crowdsourced labelers. Discarding such segments
reduces the overall unlabeled pool the querying strategy can
select from. This motivates an incremental re-labeling strategy,
which we implement based on that of Zhao et al. [44]. In this
approach, we publish the exact number of segments we aim
to be labeled (30). Instead of discarding segments that fail
the AT test, Calpric republishes those segments in following
iterations. We use N to represents the pre-set number of
labeling iterations (i.e., the maximum tries of labeling request
on one policy segment). In our case, we set it to 3. The
following example shows the workflow: in the first labeling
iteration (N = 1), we publish 30 unlabeled segments to
Amazon mTurk, each labeled by 5 crowdsourcers. For any
labels that have their AP < AT , they are considered as
unaligned and the query oracle will request an additional 5
labels for the same segment in the second labeling iteration
(N = 2), resulting in a total number of 10 labels. We repeat
the same consolidation process to check for each segment
whether these labels reach an agreement. If a clear majority
fails to emerge after a total of N = 3 tries, resulting in a total
number of 15 labels on each segment, we mark the sample as
ambiguous and remove it from the training pool.
VII. EVALUATION AND MEASUREMENTS
For evaluation, we present measurements on the data distri-
bution in Section VII-A, data similarity in Section VII-B, and a
comparison of PPWE-biLSTM with BERT in Section VII-C.
We then evaluate the effectiveness of Calpric as compared
against the the non-AL baseline model (Section VII-D), as
well as it sensitivity to various configuration parameters by
comparing the performance of various querying strategies. We
present an evaluation on different AT values in Section VII-E,
and explore different options for dealing with non-alignment
in Section VII-F. Lastly, we show how the active learning
algorithm solves the issue of class imbalance (Section VII-G).
A. Data Distribution
As mentioned, we focus on policy segments for First Party
Collection/Use, with data types being geographical location,
device information, and contact information. We extracted
these labels from APP-350 and OPP-115, and grouped them
into the same categories. We analyzed the two corpora and
summarized the results in Tables III and IV. The numbers
115 and 350 in OPP-115 and APP-350 indicate the respective
numbers of privacy policies covered by each dataset. The
number of policies covered in the corpus is different from
the number of segments with useful labels.
Location Device Contact Total
First Party Actions 403 608 1019 2030
- Positive Samples 396 604 990 1990
- Negative Samples 7 4 29 40
TABLE III: Data distribution of OPP-115 corpus (number of
segments per category)
Location Device Contact Total
First Party Actions 852 1633 1608 4093
- Positive Samples 669 1394 1270 3333
- Negative Samples 183 239 338 760
TABLE IV: Data distribution of APP-350 corpus (number of
segments per category)
We observe that the number of segments of interest for APP-
350 is much larger than that of OPP-115. Note that the web-
based OPP-115 dataset is more fine-grained and covers a larger
set of categories, whereas the mobile application policies in
APP-350 tend to be simpler. Policy segments in OPP-115 are
mostly short paragraphs while APP-350 has a smaller average
length of words per segment, usually one to two sentences.
Similar to APP-350, our data are collected from Android
mobile applications, and our segmentation algorithm generates
policy segments with their length similar to that of APP-350.
One of the existing issues in the classification of privacy
policies is the lack of negative samples. As we can see
from the data distribution of OPP-115, the positive/negative
ratio is highly imbalanced. In fact, the average Negative
Sample Ratio (NSR) is only 2.0%. Research shows that such
training data in many machine learning models can result in
poor performance [15]. While APP-350 addresses the class
imbalance issue by introducing synthetic negative data with
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OPP-115 &
APP-350
OPP-115 &
CPPS
APP-350 &
CPPS
Category
Average
Contact 0.79/0.77 0.83/0.75 0.82/0.76 0.81/0.76
Device 0.74/0.71 0.76/0.73 0.71/0.70 0.73/0.71
Location 0.75/0.77 0.81/0.77 0.78/0.76 0.78/0.77
Corpus
Average 0.76/0.75 0.80/0.75 0.76/0.74 0.78/0.75
TABLE V: Inter-similarity/re-segmented inter-similarity
manual modifications, which may not be the ideal solution,
its NSR is only 18.6%. In our proposed model, the active
learner is able to select the most representative segments and
balance the training set automatically.
B. Data Similarity
We conduct data similarity tests on OPP-115, APP-350 and
our Crowdsourcing Privacy Policy Segments (CPPS) for two
reasons: to evaluate our proposed segmentation algorithm and
to show that CPPS is similar enough to APP-350 that it is
feasibly to use labels in the APP-350 to evaluate our model
trained in CPPS.
We extract segments from the three datasets, and select 100
in each category: contact, location, and device. We evaluate
similarity on segments rather than the entire privacy policies
because our classifiers are trained on policy segments. Note
that even within a set of data obtained from a single source, the
individual policies may be very different from one another in
terms of the way they are structured, the length of the policies,
the complexity, and the wording preference. To address this,
we introduce three similarity measurements:
1) Intra-comparison (Intra): Evaluate data similarity within
the same corpus, compare similarity of segments that
share the same labeling categories.
2) Inter-comparison (Inter): Evaluate data similarity across
different corpora on the same categories. (Eg., location
labels in APP-350 vs. location labels in CPPS)
3) Inter-comparison on re-segmented policies (Re-inter):
Instead of using the original policy segments in OPP-115
and APP-350, which were extracted manually by human
lablers, we re-segment the complete policy texts of these
two datasets using Calpric’s segmentation algorithm
described in Section IV-B, and evaluate inter-similarity
on these segments.
While many existing similarity measurements are intolerant
of disjoint distributions, WMD is able to produce a smooth
measure even if two sentences do not share any word in
common. We therefore select WMD and use it on top of
our customized Fasttext word embeddings and apply it to the
100 segments from each dataset. The overall intra-similarity
for a corpus is defined as the average of all text similarity
measured across the selected segments. The similarity value
is represents the distance between sentences. In other words, a
lower distance value indicates a higher similarity. We denote
this as Similarity Distance (SD).
To evaluate our segmentation tool, we tabulate Inter/Re-
inter in Table V by the respective values in each cell separated
by slashes. Re-inter similarity distance are generally lower
than Inter similarity distances due to the original segments
in the OPP-115 and APP-350 being created differently. How-
ever, the average difference between Inter and Re-inter is
reasonably small, only 0.3%. We therefore conclude that our
automatic segmentation method produces similar segments as
the ones manually created by skilled human labelers.
Our following experiments use a testing set of segments
drawn from the APP-350 dataset. To ensure that the underlying
distribution of these datasets are similar, we compare Inter
and Intra across all three datasets. The three corpora share
similar Intra, resulting in an average of 0.75. Compared to
this value, Inter across different corpora indeed has a slightly
higher value, with an average SD of 0.78, indicating a slightly
larger difference across different corpora than within the same
set. On closer inspection, we observe that APP-350 and CPPS
are very similar in terms of segment structure and labels (0.77),
whereas OPP-115 and CPPS is the most distinct combination
among all (0.80). We therefore conclude that it is feasible to
use APP-350 as the validation set, since the inter-similarity
between APP-350 and CPPS is relatively close to the intra-
similarity of CPPS.
C. Classification Model Evaluation
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed PPWE-
biLSTM gives an accuracy similar to the state-of-the-art BERT
model, while significantly outperforming the baseline LR
classifier, which was widely used in previous privacy policy
studies.
We randomly selected 450 segments from each category
of the unlabeled training pool XU . The segments were labeled
by the crowdsourcing workers. We applied our post-processing
algorithms to discard low confidence labels, and consolidated
them into three sets of training data for contact, location, and
device, each containing 300 labeled segments. We prepared
three test sets, each containing 300 labeled segments randomly
selected from the APP-350 Corpus.
For each classification algorithm, we trained three classifiers
and evaluate them using the prepared test sets. The exper-
imental results are shown in Table VI. We use biLSTM as
an abbreviation for PPWE-biLSTM. We use two metrics to
measure accuracy: F1 score and Matthew Correlation Coeffi-
cient (MCC). MCC, which is equivalent to the mean square
contingency coefficient, represents the correlation between
target and predictions. We include the formula in Appendix B.
In binary classification, MCC is more informative since it
takes into account the balance ratios of the four confusion
matrix categories, especially when class imbalance issues [4]
exist. The value varies between −1 and +1, where 1 is a
perfect agreement between the actual and predicted labels, −1
is a perfect disagreement, and 0 occurs when the predictions
are random with respect to the actuals. We include this
additional metric since accuracy and F1 scores are asymmetric
and sensitive to data imbalance. We perform an additional
experiment using the OPP-115 and APP-350 Corpora. Similar
to the previous experiment, the classifiers are trained on
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Fig. 2: F1 and MCC for PPWE-biLSTM and BERT models
trained on contact segments
300 labels selected from each of the three categories in the
datasets. As an example, Table VII shows the results for the
location classifiers. Results for other categories are included
in Appendix F.
From the two tables we observe:
1) Both PPWE-biLSTM and BERT outperform the LR
baseline model significantly, with an average F1 score of
89.7% and 90.1% versus 67.4%, and an average MCC
value of 61.3% and 63.8% versus 10.7%.
2) Based on the F1 score and MCC values, our PPWE-
biLSTM model achieves an accuracy similar to BERT,
whereas its training time is significantly shorter than
that of BERT. We therefore proceed to investigate active
learning approaches with the PPWE-biLSTM model.
3) The average training accuracy, F1 and MCC of PPWE-
biLSTM are 98.2±1.2%, 98.4±0.9%, and 97.1±1.6%
respectively. Compared with the testing results, there is
a reasonable difference of < 10%. As an additional
example, Figure 2 shows the trend of F1 and MCC
values for contact classifiers trained on 2000 labeled
segments, further confirms that these setups do not suffer
from over-fitting.
4) Although the classifiers trained on OPP-115 have very
high accuracy, precision and recall values, the MCC
accuracy is inferior due to the unbalanced dataset. The
lack of negative samples results in nearly no training
on DoesNot data actions. That is, the classifier predicts
every label as positive.
D. Evaluation of Querying Strategies
Moving to the performance evaluation of active learning, the
following experimental setups are used in all tests related to
this topic. We specify BATCH SIZE=20 for the initial boot-
strap phase which is non-AL, and BATCH SIZE=8 for the
stage two active learning phase even though the number of
new instances labeled by crowdsourcers may not be a constant
value. A large training pool leads to a significant amount of
memory consumption during training. For testing efficiency,
Category Model Acc. Prec. Recall F1 MCC
LR 52.5% 58.7% 49.1% 53.5% 5.89%
biLSTM 80.5% 80.5% 96.6% 88.6% 58.3%Contact
BERT 82.7% 89.1% 85.6% 91.2% 62.5%
LR 76.8% 86.9% 85.9% 86.4% 7.10%
biLSTM 81.6% 97.4% 82.9% 88.7% 46.7%Device
BERT 84.3% 83.4% 97.9% 89.8% 53.4%
LR 58.6% 72.3% 54.8% 62.4% 19.1%
biLSTM 92.7% 92.7% 90.6% 91.7% 58.6%Location
BERT 90.1% 98.3% 85.6% 91.2% 62.0%
TABLE VI: Performance comparison on LR, PPWE-biLSTM, and
BERT
Acc. Prec. Recall F1 MCC
O
PP LR 94.9% 94.9% 99.9% 97.4% 0.00%biLSTM 97.9% 97.9% 100% 98.9% 0.00%
A
PP LR 63.6% 75.7% 50.9% 60.9% 31.3%biLSTM 90.7% 87.9% 95.8% 90.8% 82.3%
C
PP
S LR 58.6% 72.3% 54.8% 62.4% 19.1%
biLSTM 92.7% 92.7% 90.6% 91.7% 58.6%
TABLE VII: Performance of different location classifiers
we limit the unlabeled training pool XU to contain 12K seg-
ments, approximately 4K for each category, randomly selected
from the 52K policies crawled from Google Play. Note that
the actual labeled training set contains fewer segments, as
some instances queried by the learner do not pass the AT and
fail to be aligned. Unless specified otherwise, we repeat each
experiment three times and calculate the average accuracy.
We conduct two sets of experiments using different vali-
dation data. Both test sets are generated from the APP-350
corpus, and consist of 300 labels for each category. The
difference is that labels in Test set 1 are randomly selected
while Test set 2 is selected to be a balanced set. The former
is used to evaluate the model accuracy against the APP-
350 dataset, whereas the latter represents a generalized true
classification accuracy.
For the following experiments, we boot-strap our classifiers
with 100 labeled segments. The initial data are prepared by
random selection from the unlabeled pool XU , and are labeled
and consolidated using the rule of majority. The labeled
training data that are ready to be used are denoted as XL.
In each active learning iteration, the active learner queries
new instances from XU . The selected instances are labeled
by Turkers and the aligned labels will be added to XL. Note
that the percentage of negative samples in the initial XL differ
from one category to another: contact has the highest negative
sample rate, 31%, whereas the percentage is 23% for location,
and only 8% for device.
In addition to the four querying strategies mentioned in
Section VI-B1, we also include a baseline non-AL model
BASE for comparison, which uses random sampling to obtain
new instances. In both sets of experiments, we measure the
performance of querying algorithms using F1 score and MCC,
and conduct the same experiments for all three categories. We
note that EER does suffer from a much slower training speed
compared to other methods, as it requires a complete walk-
through of all instances to calculate the expected error for
each active learning iteration. However, the classifier training
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Fig. 3: F1 score of location classifiers with different querying
strategies (Test set 1)
Fig. 4: MCC score of location classifiers with different query-
ing strategies (Test set 1)
time is still overshadowed by the wait time for crowdsourcing
tasks, which could take days to complete. However, we point
out that if we continued our experiments and labeled more
segments, the training time would continue to grow while the
labeling time will stay constant.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 compare the F1 and the MCC perfor-
mance for different querying strategies in location classifiers
evaluated on Test set 1. In both figures, each querying algo-
rithm is associated with individual scores presented by dots,
and an estimated trendline based on its average performance
scores. We observe that all active learning models outperform
the baseline. As a reference, while the active models converge
faster, BASE reaches an F1 of 98.3% with more than 2200
labels, denoted as the converged F1 value. Figure 3 shows that,
as the most effective active learning model, BMU reaches an
F1 of 93.4%(95% of the converged F1 value) with 191 labels
while BASE needs 375 for the same score. That is, the best
active learning model uses 50.93% of the training labels used
by BASE to achieve the same result. Similarly, BMU is able to
achieve F1 = 97.3% (99% of the converged F1 value) using
749 labels, which is only 48.97% of the number of training
samples used in BASE.
To evaluate how much saving in training labels there is
Category Metric Converged Value PS low PS high
Contact MCC 0.78 70.87% 71.43%F1 0.93 85.37% 85.63%
Device MCC 0.90 27.11% 26.53%F1 0.99 35.00% 38.89%
Location MCC 0.91 42.85% 31.88%F1 0.98 48.97% 50.93%
TABLE VIII: Performance improvement: AL vs. non-AL
(Test set 1)
when using active learning, we introduce two Percentile Scores
(PS): PS high and PS low, representing the 90th percentile
and 85th percentile for MCC, and the 99th percentile and
95th percentile for F1 score, since F1 values converge faster.
We also define Training Effort Percentage (TEP) for each
Percentile Score (PS) as TEP = nALnBASE , where nBASE is the
number of training samples used in BASE to achieve a specific
performance goal, and nAL is that number of the best case
active learning model. A lower score value indicates a more
effective active learning algorithm. That is, a querying strategy
uses fewer training samples to achieve the same performance.
Going back to the example of Figure 3, for location classi-
fiers, the 48.97% we calculated is the TEP of PSlow for F1
score, whereas its PSlow is 50.93%, which are also shown
in Table VIII. In general, while all active learning querying
models outperform BASE, BMU has the best performance
among all. We also observe that, compared to the baseline,
the largest amount of training effort saved when using active
learning models occurs in the device classifiers, where the
initial training set is the most imbalanced. The improvements
in contact classifiers are relatively small compared to the other
two categories, as the contact dataset contains more negative
samples. Further evaluations on active learning models and
class imbalance will be presented in Section VII-G.
We also make an observation from Table VIII that the most
effective active learning models are the ones trained on the
device category, whereas the contact active learning classifiers
do not save as much labeling effort. This is reasonable since
privacy policy segments on device information tend to be
simpler and more straightforward than contact and location.
The average length of device segments is also slightly shorter
than the other two. As an example, indications for device labels
are mainly “device information” and “IP address”, whereas the
contact category contains a lot more relevant keywords, such
as email, phone number, contact book, different social network
accounts such as Facebook, Twitter, or Google. Moreover,
the keyword “contact” may also refer to other meanings. For
instance, most privacy policies include a section for users to
contact the App developers. Such sentences are also associated
with email address or phone number, making it difficult for
the classifiers to differentiate such segments from the actual
data practice of collection/usage of contact information. As
a result, it requires more labeling effort to achieve a nearly
converged accuracy.
In the second set of experiments, we evaluate the models
using the balanced validation set Test set 2. As the initial
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Fig. 5: Training effort on Test set 2: AL vs. non-AL
training set has significant class imbalance issues, perfor-
mance scores on Test set 2 converge slower than that of
Test set 1. We therefore focus on the early stage of training
and investigate the amount of labeling effort saved by active
learning models to achieve an early performance goal. We
set the stopping criteria for all classification models to be:
MCC > 0.2 and F1 > 70%. We run experiments on the three
categories, and observe similar results as those for Test set 1:
All active learning models outperform BASE, with BMU
being the faster model to reach the stopping goal. Figure 5
summarizes the difference in labeling effort when using active
learning and non-AL BASE models. We conclude that our
active learning model is able to achieve the same performance
with fewer training labels, whether the test sets are perfectly
balanced or reflect the actual data distribution of the input
space.
Similar to the previous experiments, the TE percentage is
calculated using the ratio of nAL and nBASE . However, we
observe a difference in these TE values: the device active
learning classifier has a higher TE than the other two cate-
gories, while the TE for contact classifier drops to the lowest.
This is also reasonable, as the second experiment is done in
the early stage of a training process. Looking at the actual
number of training samples shown in Figure 5, we observe
that classifiers for all data categories require approximately
200 labels to be able to surpass a 70% F1 score, and 280
labels to achieve an MCC higher than 0.2.
E. Impacts of Acceptance Threshold
To investigate the relationship between AT values and the
learning speed, we experiment on three different AT values:
100%, 80%, and 60% using the same active learning model.
The testing model is implemented with BMU, which was
shown to be the best querying strategy in the previous section.
We aim to introduce 30 new labels in each active learning
iteration, therefore we set the learner to query 42 unlabeled
segments per iteration, according to the average alignment
rate of 73%. After the annotation, Calpric downloads the
resulting labels and process them with the rule of majority.
It consolidates these labels only when the number of majority
Fig. 6: MCC performance for different AT
votes reaches the testing threshold. For instance, if the current
testing AT = 1.0, we train our classifiers using only the
perfectly aligned labels (all workers agree on the same label),
and discard the remaining ones where AR < AT.
We define each crowdsourcing label obtained from Amazon
mTurk as one unit of labeling effort (LE). In other words, LE
takes into account the segments sent for labeling but do not
reach the minimum AT. In this experiment, we allocate 8000
units of LE to each AT value during the active querying phase.
That is, the active learning model is able to query up to 1600
different unlabeled segments, each labeled by five Turkers,
even if some of them will not align. We set the boot-strap LE
at 100 for each classifier, which means they will probably end
up with different numbers of initial training labels because of
the different AT values. We train classifiers separately using
the post-processed aligned labels according to each pre-set AT,
and evaluate their performance using the balanced validation
set: Test set 2.
Figure 6 shows the trend of learning speed vs. MCC perfor-
mance. Both AT = 0.8 and AT = 1.0 outperform AT = 0.6.
While they share a similar performance trend, AT = 1.0 is less
stable, as shown by the large fluctuations, as its training set
is significantly smaller than that of AT = 0.8 and AT = 0.6.
We include a figure showing the relationship between the
number of aligned labels and the amount of LE allocated
in Appendix E. On the other hand, despite having a large
training set, AT = 0.6 results in the worst performance. This is
because the low AT value allows labels with low confidence to
be added to the dataset, resulting in unwanted label noise. We
include the graph for F1 improvement trend in Appendix D as
it is not as obvious as that of MCC. In general, the use of active
learning results in a larger improvement in MCC performance
compared to the F1 score, because active learning in our study
naturally targeted the class imbalance problem, and MCC is a
direct measurement of how the classifiers are making balanced
predictions. In practice, to improve the MCC performance, one
should train the model using a more balanced dataset. On the
other hand, the most effective way to increase the F1 score is
to train models using a larger training set. Our AT experiments
are done on relatively small training sets with an average size
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Category AT Aligned Labels F1 MCC
Contact
0.6 1266 0.6318 0.1273
0.8 673 0.6535 0.1870
1.0 239 0.6503 0.1889
Device
0.6 1308 0.6499 0.0909
0.8 885 0.6583 0.1059
1.0 547 0.6547 0.1147
Location
0.6 1333 0.6795 0.1167
0.8 829 0.6999 0.1596
1.0 542 0.6551 0.0679
TABLE IX: AT performance comparison using 1600 labels
of 847 aligned labels. As a result, the improvement in F1 will
be rather insignificant.
The full performance comparison is summarized in Ta-
ble IX. Although in most cases AT = 1.0 and AT = 0.8
outperform AT = 0.6, we do observe a difference in the
results for the location classifiers only: When AT is set to 1.0,
the both F1 and MCC performance drop to the worst among
all three AT values.
While other classifiers are trained on samples with similar
NSR despite being set to different AT, the location classifiers
are not. We calculated the standard deviation for NSR in
the three categories: 0.0425 for contact, 0.0301 for device,
and 0.1239 for location. Specifically, labels consolidated using
AT = 0.6 and AT = 0.8 contain an average of 52.0% and
52.1% negative samples, respectively, whereas AT = 1.0 only
has an NSR of 25.5%. Furthermore, as the AT value increases,
the total number of aligned labels decreases, together resulting
in only 138 negative labels for the 1.0 classifier. It is possible
that the some crowdsourcers did not agree on labels of
potential negative samples. Because we set AT to be 100%,
any misalignment will result in the failure to produce to pass
the AT. These unaligned labels are not allowed to be added
into the training set. Since we test on a relatively small XU
(4K unlabeled segments), we may have run out of negative
samples quickly, and the active learner would not able to query
more informative segments to be labeled. Being trained on an
imbalanced dataset, the Location − AT = 1.0 model suffers
from under-fitting, and its F1 accuracy and MCC reflect this.
We explore re-labeling methods to handle discarded labels in
Section VII-F, and further investigate the impact of negative
samples in Section VII-G.
Also note that the AR for AT = 0.8 obtained in this ex-
periment seems to be lower than that in previous experiments
(73%) in which instances are randomly selected. We suspect
this is due to the active selection bias, where the queried labels
contain more uncertainty than others.
From the above experiments, we conclude that AT = 0.8
is the appropriate pre-set threshold for active learning policy
classification systems of a size similar to that of our prototype
tool. That being said, given a very large unlabeled training
pool and an unlimited amount of LE, AT = 1.0 does achieve
the performance ceiling, as it has the lowest possibility of
introducing additional label noise to the training set.
F. Re-labeling strategies
In theory, we should not discard unaligned labels in active
learning classification, as they do contain a significant amount
of information, which could potentially improve the model
performance. As described in Section VI-B3, we implement
two types of methods to handle unaligned labels: Label and
Discard (L&D) and Incremental Re-Labeling (IRL). In this
section, we compare these strategies using the following setup:
active learning models with BMU querying strategy and AT
value set to 80%. We use the 12K training pool and evaluate
the classifiers using Test set 2.
We run the IRL model on classifiers based on the three
different categories, and allow each classifier to re-label up
to 100 segments. The number is denoted as the allocated re-
labeling resource. As mentioned, we set the maximum number
of labeling iterations to be N = 3. Under such circumstances,
if we re-label one segment (N = 2) and a total of 10
crowdsourcers still could not agree on a single label, we
can once again publish this segment to be labeled (N = 3),
resulting in a total of 15 labels. That being said, if we publish
the same segment twice, we count this as two units used in
the re-labeling resource.
We introduce a measurement of how effective the re-
labeling process is. The re-labeling Success Rate (RSR) is
defined as a ratio of the number of successfully aligned labels
after re-labeling and the total allocated re-labeling resource.
We calculate RSR for each classifier. Unfortunately, the re-
sults for relabeling are not promising. Out of 100 relabeled
segments, only 2 passed the AT after N = 2 and only 1 passed
the AT after N = 3, resulting in an overall RSR of 3%.
One possible reason for such a low RSR is that, because our
question surveys are carefully designed and reviewed, with the
additional qualification tests, crowdsourcers are able to provide
correct labels as long as they pay attention to the questions.
Furthermore, if the segment is longer and more complex than
usual, the possibility of misinterpretation increases, affecting
the successful rate of label alignment. This is proven by our
experiment, as most re-labeled and aligned labels have longer
lengths than the average.
Another consideration is that, some labels are ambiguous
by nature. For instance, examples of the relabeled and failed
include: “your GPS geo-location is not accessed without your
consent” and “you will be asked for your permission each
time a location-based service is requested to provide you
with local search results.” It is obvious that the software is
trying to access user information in order to perform a certain
service. However, users also have the choice to disable such
functionalities, or opt out of specific features. Such segments,
even when crowdsourcers agree on the label itself, may not
reflect the actual legal content. What is worse, these labels may
introduce additional data noise and contaminate the training
set.
We conclude that developing a more complex re-labeling
design may not be an ideal choice to avoid under-fitting.
Many of the segments that do not reach AT the first time are
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Fig. 7: Train set NSR for different querying strategies
likely ambiguous and are unlikely to pass AT if more labels
are obtained from Turkers, and thus it is generally a more
efficient use of resources to discard such segments. Instead,
we should construct a larger unlabeled training pool XU for
the active learning system to query as many informative labels
as possible.
G. Percentage of Negative Samples
In previous experiments, we observe that the active learning
models not only improve the training speed, but also solve
the existing problem of class imbalance in privacy policy
classification.
Figure 7 shows the trends of NSR for the labeled training
set XL using different querying strategies. We observe steep
rises in LC, BMU, and EER, and a slightly higher NSR
in ID than that of BASE. This is reasonable, as the initial
boot-strap training set contains fewer negative samples. The
classifiers are more uncertain on such instances, and query
more of them during each active learning iteration. We note
that all NSR converge back to the initial value as the size of XL
increases. This is due to our limited XU , which contains only
4K unlabeled segments that can be potentially queried. As
mentioned, the number of negative samples in privacy policies
tend to be much fewer than that of the positive ones. Thus, it
is likely that all negative samples are used up as the training
process continues.
Figure 8 confirms this hypothesis. All active learning mod-
els query more negative instances than the random baseline
model. As a result, while there are still remaining negative
samples in XU for BASE, other models run out of negative
samples in the first few hundreds of learning iterations. For
future work, it will be crucial to obtain a reasonably large
XU before training the active learning models to ensure the
set contains an adequate number of negative samples. We can
approximate the amount of negative training labels needed to
achieve certain goals, and back calculate the required size of
unlabeled training pool XU using the estimate percentage of
NSR in the pool.
Fig. 8: Unlabeled pool NSR for different querying strategies
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
As the first automated privacy policy analyzer that uses
active learning, we designed and built Calpric as a prototype.
Since we trained for contact, location, and device segments,
our classifier is able to identify only those data practices asso-
ciated with this information. We look forward to expanding our
binary classifiers to more categories, as well as to a second-
level in which data practices are classified into First Party
Collection/Use and Third Party Sharing. We aim to develop
an automated report tool that can take any raw privacy policy
texts and output a human-readable report to summarize all user
data mentioned in the policies.
IX. CONCLUSION
We propose Calpric, the first crowdsourcing active learning
framework that performs automated classification of privacy
policies with high accuracy, using only a small amount of
training labels. It proactively selects the most informative
batches of policy segments from the unlabeled training pool,
increasing the benefit of each label. Calpric opens opportu-
nities for privacy policy classifiers to achieve high accuracy
with a limited labeling budget. It helps app users and regulators
to analyze data practices in privacy policies without reading
through copious amounts of text.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Below are the questions used in our Amazon mTurk HITs.
Note that the questions are adjusted depending on the type of
private information we are asking the Turkers to label (i.e.,
“contact” would be adjusted to “location” and “device ID”
accordingly).
1) Does the segment talk about FIRST PARTY data prac-
tice (collect/use information from users)?
© Yes
© No
2) Does the segment claim to collect/use CONTACT infor-
mation?
© Yes
© No
APPENDIX B
MATTHEW CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Below shows the formula for Matthew Correlation Coeffi-
cient (MCC):
MCC= TP×TN−FP×FN√
(TP+FP )(TP+FN)(TN+FP )(TN+FN)
, (2)
where TP, TN, FP, FN are true positives, true negatives, false
positives and false negatives, respectively.
APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ACTIVE LEARNING
QUERYING STRATEGIES
Basic Uncertainty: The basic uncertainty is also called
the Least Confidence (LC) strategy, proposed by Culotta and
McCallum [6]. The active learner selects the least certain
instance from the unlabeled set and request for it to be labeled.
The confidence probability is calculated using:
max
y∈Y
[1− P(y ∈ Y |x)] (3)
Margin & Entropy Sampling: Other popular uncertainty
querying strategies include Margin Sampling and Entropy
Sampling. The former selects instances where the difference
between the first most likely and second most likely classes
are the smallest [29], whereas the latter chooses samples with
the largest entropy in class probabilities [33]. In other words,
instead of minimizing the classification error, entropy method
tries to minimize the log loss.
For binary classification, margin and entropy-based sam-
pling are reduced to the LC strategy. In such cases, the three
methods will query instances with a class posterior closest to
0.5, that is, the most ambiguous segments [30]. We confirmed
this conclusion using our CPPS dataset. In future evaluation,
we use Uncertainty Sampling to represent the three querying
strategies.
Expected Error Reduction: Instead of considering in-
dividual instances along, there are methods take the entire
input space into account, which have the potential to prevent
sub-optimal queries. The Expected Error Reduction (EER)
sampling method selects instances that make the most impact
on the current model. Specifically, it measures how much
the generalization error is likely to be reduced as the new
samples are introduced to the model. We built upon Roy and
McCallum’s work [27], calculate the expected future error of
a classifier using the Monte Carlo Estimation. Below shows
the formula to estimate the binary loss, which is used in our
evaluation:
EP∗XL (binary) =
1
|XU |
∑
x∈XU
(1−max
y∈Y
P ∗XL(y|x)), (4)
where XU is the unlabeled training pool and
∗
XL is the current
training set with the chosen query (x∗, y∗) added to the orig-
inal labeled training set XL. We calculate expected error for
each possible label, y ∈ {y0, y1} using the learner’s prediction
distribution P ∗XL . As the true label for x
∗ is unknown before
the query, we use the current model to estimate the true label
probabilities. We design our model with a p subsample of 0.5
to improve runtime for large sample pools.
Density-Weighted Methods: Settles and Craven [31] pro-
pose the Information Density (ID) framework. When querying
new samples, ID not only considers uncertain instances, but
also those which are representative of the dense region of the
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input space. The ID value of an instance x can be calculated
as follow:
ID(x) =
1
|XU |
XU∑
x=1
sim(x, x¯), (5)
where sim(x, x¯) is a similarity function such as cosine simi-
larity or Euclidean similarity. The value is calculated using x
and the average similarity (denoted by x¯) of all other instances
in the input distribution. A higher ID value represents a closer
relationship between the given instance and the rest of samples
in XU .
Batch Sampling Querying: Traditional active learning
query strategies suffer from sub-optimal record selection when
passing n instances > 1, that is, querying multiple instances
in each iteration. The Batch Mode Uncertainty (BMU) sam-
pling method addresses this issue by enforcing a importance
ranking system for records among the batch. Our design makes
use of the modAL active learning framework, which is built
upon the study of Cardoso et al. [3]. They implement a
BMU framework to prioritize diversity on the initial iterations,
providing a global view of the input distribution. As the
number of labeled instances increases, the system then shifts
the priority to instances in which the classifier is uncertain
about. The ranking score of each instance x is calculated as:
BMU(x) = α(1− sim(x,XL) + (1− α)LC(x), (6)
where α = |X
U |
|XU+XL| , LC(x) is the uncertainty of predictions
for x calculated by the LC algorithm. The similarity function
sim(x,XL) measures to what extend the feature space is
explored near x. The BM score is calculated for all x in XU ,
and ranked in ascending order. In each active learning iteration,
a preset number of instances are selected from the pool in this
order, and the BM scores will be re-calculated.
APPENDIX D
EVALUATION ON F1 PERFORMANCE FOR DIFFERENT AT
USING CONTACT CLASSIFIERS
Figure 9 shows the trend of learning speed vs. F1 Score
performance. In general, the scores in all three cases are
relatively closed to each other. However, AT = 1.0 is less
stable compared to others, as shown by the large fluctuations,
because its training set is significantly smaller than that of
AT = 0.8 and AT = 0.6.
APPENDIX E
NUMBER OF ALIGNED LABELS VS. LABELING EFFORT
(LE) FOR DIFFERENT AT USING CONTACT CLASSIFIERS
Figure 10 shows how many labeled instances are generated
from the same LE when the AT values vary. We observe a
pattern in which the lower the AT is, the more aligned labels
we receive from the same amount of allocated LE.
APPENDIX F
EVALUATION USING SINGLE-SOURCED DATASET
In addition to Table VII, evaluation results for the other
two categories are included in Tables X and Table XI. We use
biLSTM as an abbreviation for PPWE-biLSTM.
Fig. 9: F1 performance for different AT on contact classifiers
Fig. 10: Aligned labels vs. LE for different AT on contact
classifiers
Acc. Prec. Recall F1 MCC
O
pp LR 88.9% 91.2% 96.5% 93.8% 43.3%
biLSTM 97.9% 97.9% 100% 98.9% 0.00%
A
pp LR 64.6% 68.5% 67.3% 67.9% 28.6%
biLSTM 87.7% 96.9% 82.0% 88.5% 76.9%
C
PP
S LR 52.5% 58.7% 49.1% 53.5% 5.89%
biLSTM 88.6% 83.5% 95.3% 88.7% 75.8%
TABLE X: Performance of contact classifiers trained on LR and
PPWE-biLSTM models
Acc. Prec. Recall F1 MCC
O
pp LR 96.9% 96.9% 99.9% 98.5% 0.00%
biLSTM 100% 100% 100% 100% 0.00%
A
pp LR 59.6% 64.2% 61.8% 62.9% 18.6%
biLSTM 88.6% 86.2% 90.6% 88.2% 74.6%
C
PP
S LR 76.8% 86.9% 85.9% 86.4% 7.10%
biLSTM 81.6% 97.4% 82.9% 88.7% 46.7%
TABLE XI: Performance of device classifier trained on LR and
PPWE-biLSTM models
16
